objects. We can systematically assign types to the objects about which we speak in the following way: let ι denote the type of individuals (the range of first-order quantifiers) and let o denote the type of formulas (a boolean value which is true or false). We can then write the type of a set of individuals as ι Ñ o, to each individual we map a boolean value according to whether it is or is not in the set. Similarly we can write the type of a unary function as ι Ñ ι, a mapping of individuals to individuals.
Higher-order logic, or simple type theory as it is often called, is then obtained from turning the above into an inductive definition allowing the formation of more complicated types such as for example pι Ñ ιq Ñ pι Ñ oq and considering quantifiers for all such types.
A good basis for higher-order logic is the typed lambda calculus which also forms a useful background theory for studying properties of programming languages.
The quantification over such higher types appears frequently in mathematics. For example, the most basic notion in topology, that of an open set has the type pι Ñ oq Ñ o because it is a property of sets of individuals. In functional analysis operators which map functions to functions play an important role. An object which maps a function to a function has the type pι Ñ ιq Ñ pι Ñ ιq.
Type theories find practical applications in proof assistants such as Isabelle, Coq, etc. These are software systems that allow a user to formalize a proof in an electronic format.
Helpful additional literature for this couse include [4, 6, 5, 1, 3, 2] . Definition 1. 1 . A proof in natural deduction for classical logic NK is a tree of formulas. A leaf of this tree is called axiom if it is of the form A 2A for some formula A or t t for some term t. Otherwise a leaf is an assumption. Each assumption is either open or discharged. An open assumption is just a formula A, it can be discharged by a rule below it and is then written as rAs i where i is the number of the rule which has discharged it.
A proof of a formula A possibly containing axioms as well as open or discharged assumptions is written using dots as . . . .
A
Sometimes it is convenient to give a name to a proof; this is written as . Make sure you understand how this proof is constructed step by step successively discharging assumptions.
For a set of sentences Γ and a sentence A we write Γ 6 A if A is provable using assumptions from Γ. A set of sentences Γ is called deductively closed if Γ 6 A implies A Γ; a deductively closed set of sentences is -more briefly -called theory. A set of sentences Γ is called consistent if Γ 8 u.
The central properties of first-order logic are given by the following theorems:
Theorem 1.1 (Soundness). Every provable formula is valid.
While soundness is usually straightforward to prove, the following results require more work.
Theorem 1.2 (Completeness).
Every valid formula is provable.
Theorem 1.3 (Compactness).
If Γ is a set of sentences s.t. every finite Γ 0 Γ is satisfiable, then Γ is satisfiable.
Theorem 1.4 (Löwenheim-Skolem).
If Γ has a model, then Γ has a countable model.
The strongest version of these results from which Completeness, Compactness and the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem can be derived as simple corollaries is the following Lemma 1. 1 . Every consistent set of sentences has a countable model.
The following exercises are helpful for refreshing your knowledge about first-order logic. 3 . Find a formula in the empty language which is true in a structure S iff the domain of S has exactly 3 elements.
Exercise 1. 4 . Find a formula which has an infinite but no finite models. Hint: first show ψpI 1 ptqq I 2 ptq by induction on the term structure of t and then (a) by induction on formula structure.
The language of arithmetic is L N t0{0, s{1, {2, ¤{2, {2u. The standard model of arithmetic is the L N -structure N pN, Iq where I is the obvious standard-interpretation of the symbols in
(b) Show that there is a structure which is elementary equivalent but not isomorphic to N . Hint: Add a new constant symbol c to L N , successively force c to be larger than each natural number and apply the compactness theorem.
A structure as in (b) is called non-standard model of arithmetic. Exercise 1.8. A theory T is called countably categorical if, whenever S 1 and S 2 are countably infinite models of T , then S 1 and S 2 are isomorphic.
A theory T is called complete if, for every sentence A either T 6 A or T 6 2A.
Show that a countably categorical theory without finite models is complete.
Second-Order Logic

Syntax and Semantics
The syntax of second-order logic is obtained from that of first-order logic by adding predicate variables and function variables as well as quantification over these newly introduced variables. As a notational convention we use letters X, Y, . . . for predicate variables and u, v, . . . for function variables. Often the arity of these variables will be clear from the context or irrelevant. If , not it is indicated as u{r, X{r. As in first-order logic we use x, y, . . . for individual variables.
When moving from first-to second-order logic the definition of a language and of a structure is not changed. Only the notion of terms, formulas and accordingly the truth definition is extended.
Definition 2.1. For a language L, the set of L-terms is as follows:
The free variables and bound variables of a formula are defined to include predicate and function variables in the obvious way. As in first-order logic, a sentence is a formula without free variables. Definition 2. 3 . We say that a structure S pD, Iq interprets a formula A if every constant symbol, function symbol, predicate symbol and free variable of A is in the domain of I.
Definition 2. 4 . Let A be a formula and S pD, Iq be a structure that interprets A. Then the truth of A in S is defined by induction on A:
and analogously for the disjunction and the existential quantifiers hx, hX and hu.
As the above definitions show, the move from first-to second-order logic does not require substantially new ideas on the level of the basic syntax and semantics. We only generalize quantifiers in a straightforward way to speak also about functions and relations. However, this generalization considerably increases the expressive power of the logic (as we will see in the next sections). 
Definability
We first develop some syntactic sugar to speak about sets in second-order logic. First of all, note that a set is just a unary predicate. In this special case of unary predicates we use the notation x Y for Y pxq. But be careful, the symbol in this expression is not a predicate itself, it is only part of a notational convention. Another useful notational convention are bounded quantifiers: 
Then R is transitive, has successors on IpY q but no fixed points and hence pD, Iq B FinpY q.
A very useful notation in second-and even more so in higher-order logic is provided by the lambda calculus. To explain it, consider the syntactic expression x 2 5. This can be read as a term in a first-order language containing the binary function symbols and "to the power of" as well as the constant symbols 2 and 5 and the variable x. Often when writing such expressions we want to consider the function that maps the value x 2 5 to x. In ordinary mathematical notation, this function is often written as x Þ Ñ x 2 5. In the lambda calculus this function is denoted as λx.x 2 5. This notation has the advantage that nested expressions are easier to read which is helpful in higher-order logic. The step from the term x 2 5 to the function which associates the value x 2 5 to x is called abstraction. This notation is also used for expressions which contain more variables, so for example λxλy.x 3 x ¤ y ¡ 5 ¤ z is a function with the two arguments x and y and the parameter z.
The application of a function f to an argument x is denoted as f x in the lambda calculus. So for example pλx.x 2 5q3 denotes the application of the above function to 3. An abstraction followed by an application can then be reduced by replacing the variable of the abstraction by the argument:
We will use the λ-notation and this kind of reduction (called β-reduction) at various occasions in an informal ways until we study the lambda calculus more thoroughly in the context of higher-order logic.
Using the notation of the lambda calculus, we can for example define new predicates from existing ones, e.g. given P {1 and Q{1 the predicate R{1 which is true if both P and Q are true can be written as:
Similarly, we can define the empty set explicitely as r λx.u and the universe as
The sentence FinpUq is hence true in a structure S iff S is finite. Definition 2. 5 . A class of structures C is called first-order definable (second-order definable) if there is a set of first-order (second-order) sentences Γ s.t. the models of Γ are exactly the elements of C.
If a class C is definable by a finite set of sentences Γ, then it is definable by the sentence
In this case we say that C is definable by a sentence (of firstor second-order logic respectively). 
1. The class of structures of cardinality n is hence defined by E n . 2a. Suppose there is a set of sentences Γ s.t. S @ Γ iff S is finite. Let Γ I Γ tL i | i ¥ 1u and observe that Γ I is unsatisfiable: a model of Γ I would need to be finite to satisfy Γ but larger than any i N. Let Γ 0 be an arbitrary finite subset of Γ I , then there is an k N s.t. L i Γ 0 implies that i k. Now let S be any structure of size k, then S @ Γ and S @ L i for all L i Γ 0 hence S @ Γ 0 . So every finite Γ 0 Γ has a model. Therefore, by the compactness theorem, Γ I has a model. Contradiction This strategy for showing the undefinability of a property in first-order logic by using the compactness theorem as in point 2a of the above theorem is important and will reappear at a number of occasions during this course. Make sure you understand how it works.
Also note how subtle a line we were able to draw here: a particular class, that of infinite structures, can be defined by an infinite set of formulas in first-order logic not however by a finite set. A situation such as in Proposition 2.2 is quite typical for the definability of many properties that are related to infinity. on the same argument which shows that one cannot have the compactness theorem in a setting where the class of finite models is definable. We are in the situation of a drawback: we can only have one but not both. In the case of first-order logic we know that the compactness theorem holds hence the class of finite structures cannot be defined. In the case of second-order logic we know that the class of finite structures can be defined and hence the compactness theorem cannot hold.
We will now move on to see that also the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem fails in second-order logic. We abbreviate
and use bounded quantification also for this relation
Now we want to compare sets w.r.t. their size. For finite sets this is easy: just count the number of elements, the set that has more elements is larger. For infinite sets the issue is a bit more subtle. We can say that an infinite set S is larger than an infinite set R if there is a surjection
which expresses exactly that. Furthermore, define (c) . . . are definable by a second-order sentence.
Exercise 2. 3 . We work in the (first-order) language L t0{0, 1{0, {2, ¡{1, ¤{2, ¡1 {1u of rings.
Show that the class of rings is definable by a first-order sentence.
Hint: consult your algebra textbook or wikipedia.
The characteristic of a ring is the smallest number n ¡ 0 s.t.
n times if such a number n exists. If no such n exists, the characteristic of the ring is 0. A characteristic n $ 0 is also called finite characteristic. For example, the ring of integers modulo m has characteristic m, the ring Z has characteristic 0.
Show that:
2. For every k ¥ 2, the class of rings of characteristic k is definable by a first-order sentence.
3. The class of rings of finite characteristic . . . (c) . . . is definable by a second-order sentence.
Proofs
A calculus for first-order logic can be extended to second-order logic in a natural way. For the case of natural deduction, in order to obtain NK2 it suffices to add the following rules to NK:
if the number of variables inx is the arity of X (or of u respectively) and B (or t respectively) does not contain a variable that is bound in A.
if X 0 (or u 0 respectively) has the same arity as X (or u respectively) and X 0 (or u 0 respectively) does not occur in A nor in the open assumptions of π. For the existential quantifier: . . . .
ArXzλx.Bs
hX A h I . . . .
Aruzλx.ts
hu A h I if the number of variables inx is the arity of X (or of u respectively) and B (or t respectively) does not contain a variable that is bound in A.
respectively) has the same arity as X (or u respectively) and X 0 (or u 0 respectively) does not occur in A nor in the open assumptions of the right-hand proof of A.
Observe that the extension to the second-order system is quite natural; it does not require any new ideas, just the adaption of the first-order system to the case of the second-order quantifiers, all side conditions are analogous. The extension of the semantics has been an equally straightforward adaption of the first-order semantics. The question is hence natural whether the relationship between syntax and semantics generalizes from first-to second-order logic in the same straightforward way. While the soundness of the above inference rules is an easy exercise we will see in the next section that the completeness theorem will fail in secondorder logic. where the vertical dots represent a straightforward proof in first-order logic. Usually the line containing the lambda-expression is not written down, it is done here for expository purposes only.
Exercise 2. 4 . Show that dX dY pX Y Ñ X ¤ Y q is valid by giving a proof in NK2. Show that dX dY pX ¤ Y Ñ X Y q is not valid by specifying a counterexample.
Exercise 2. 5 . There is a philosophical principle attributed to Leibniz which states that equality of two objects means that they have all properties in common ("Leibniz equality"). Mathematically speaking, a property is just a set, so this can be formulated in second-order logic:
To do so, we define a translation L of second-order formulas containing equality into such that do not by defining:
In this exercise we assume that formulas only contain the connectives 2, , d in order to avoid repetition of analogous cases. 
Show that
Second-Order Arithmetic
First some reminders: the language of arithmetic is L N t0{0, s{1, {2, ¤{2, {2u. The standard model is N pN, I s q where I s interprets the constant symbol 0 by the natural number 0, the unary function symbol s by the successor function and so on. We have already seen in the exercises that there are non-standard models of arithmetic, i.e. structures that satisfy the same first-order sentences as N but which are not isomorphic to N . These models are rather strange creatures which possess, in addition to the standard numbers also non-standard numbers which start after (in the sense of the interpretation of ) infinity. We will now see that second-order logic allows to rule out these non-standard models and thus to uniquely define the natural numbers.
Definition 2. 6 . The theory Q of minimal arithmetic is the deductive closure of the following set of axioms:
dx x ¢ 0 dxdy px spyq Ø px y x yqq dxdy px y x y y xq Theorem 2.3 (Σ 1 -completeness of Q). If N @ hx A where A is quantifier-free, then Q 6 hx A Before we sketch the proof another reminder: a numeral is a term of the form s n p0q. It is the canonical way to represent the number n N in the language of arithmetic.
Proof Sketch. If N @ hx A then there is an n N s.t. N @ Arxzs ns. By a straightforward (but long) argument one can show that every such Arxzs ns has a Q-proof 1 . Hence Q 6 hx A by a single application of h I .
Definition 2.7 (Second-Order Arithmetic). The induction axiom is
Ind dX p Xp0q Ñ dx pXpxq Ñ XpspxÑ dx Xpxq q.
Denote with SOA the conjunction of Ind and all axioms of Q.
We will now see that there are no non-standard models of second-order arithmetic. The sentence SOA uniquely defines the natural numbers in the sense that -up to isomorphism -the only model of SOA is the standard model. More precisely what we will show is:
1 Try it for a simple Arxzs ns, e.g. for spsp0qq sp0q spspsp0as an exercise.
The isomorphism in the proof of Theorem 2.4 This theorem is sometimes formulated as the statement "Second-order arithmetic is categorical". This refers to the terminology of calling a theory categorical if all its models are isomorphic. As a reminder, the definition of isomorphism for structures is repeated below. 
Proof. Analogous to first-order logic 2 .
So when we try to define a particular structure by a set of sentences (be that in first-or in second-order logic) we can never expect more than a definition up to isomorphism.
Proof of Theorem 2. 4 . First note that N @ SOA as both induction as well as the axioms of Q are true in N . As M N , the right-to-left direction is done by Proposition 2.3.
For the left-to-right direction, let pD, Iq @ SOA and define a function ψ : N Ñ D, n Þ Ñ Ips nq which we will show to be the required isomorphism. For understanding this proof, it is important to be aware of the types of the objects involved as we are dealing with three different domains here: the natural numbers, L N -terms and M , see Figure 2 . We want to use this result for showing that the completeness theorem fails in second-order logic. There is a subtle issue here that is worth discussing: the completeness theorem can be formulated in two different ways: one abstract and one concrete. You are probably most familiar with the concrete version which, for a particular calculus, says that each valid formula is provable in this calculus. For a setting where the completeness theorem fails, one could -in principle -prove the negation of this statement, i.e. show for a particular calculus (like NK2) that it does not prove all valid (second-order) formulas. While this result is true it is not very meaningful: it does not rule out the possibility that a simple extension of the calculus by a few more inference rules would result in a complete system.
It is this point where the abstract statement of the completeness theorem becomes important. The abstract version states that the set of valid first-order formulas is recursively enumerable. As a reminder, a set is called recursively enumerable if -informally -there is a program that outputs exactly the elements of the set. A proof calculus can be used as basis for such a program as follows: compute all possible proofs by starting with any axiom and applying iteratively all inference rules to all already generated proofs and for each proof thus generated output the formula it has proved. Therefore the abstract version of the completeness theorem follows from its concrete version.
In our setting of second-order logic -where completeness fails -we will prove the negation of the abstract version because it shows (by the above argument) that there is no calculus which is sound and complete for second-order logic. This will be based on the following result. So the completeness theorem (as the compactness-and the Löwenheim-Skolem-theorem) fails in second-order logic. These failures of important results about the logic are the price we have to pay for its high expressivity.
Inductive Definitions
In this section we will examine the proof of the categoricity of second-order arithmetic from a more abstract point of view in order to better understand the aspect of second-order logic that we have used for defining the natural numbers. What we will find is a very powerful mechanism: inductive definitions. Once more the pattern repeats: the increase in expressive power goes hand-in-hand with the loss of certain nice properties of the logic -now we are trading completeness for closure under inductive definitions. So a structure where Ind is true is one that satisfies dy Nat. Nat is a formula with one free variable y. Given a structure S pD, Iq, a formula F with one free variable y defines a subset of D, the set of m D s.t. pD, I ty Þ Ñ muq @ F . Example 2. 3 . The formula y $ 1 dx phz x ¤ z y Ñ x 1 x yq defines the set of prime numbers in the standard model of arithmetic.
More generally, we can define an n-ary relation by a formula with n free variables as follows: Definition 2.9. Let pD, Iq be a structure and F a formula whose free variable are y 1 , . . . , y n , abbreviated asȳ. Then the expression λȳ.F is called definition of the relation Ipλȳ.F q tm pm 1 , . . . , m n q D n | pD, I tȳ Þ Ñmuq @ F u.
Note that Ipλȳ.F q D n . In this notation, the expression λy.Nat defines the set Ipλy.Natq tm D | pD, I ty Þ Ñ muq @ dX pXp0q Ñ dx pXpxq Ñ XpspxÑ Xpyqqu. In other words, an element m D is in Ipλy.Natq if it is in every set which contains Ip0q and is closed under Ipsq, i.e. if it is in the smallest set which contains Ip0q and is closed under Ipsq. How can we obtain this set? By a limit process which successively adds elements thus converging towards Ipλy.Natq.
Consider the following rules:
Ip0q S m S Ipsqpmq S
The set Ipλy.Natq can be obtained as limit of the process which applies these rules to all members of the set thus constructing a sequence S 0 r, S 1 , S 2 , . . . where S i 1 is obtained from S i by closing it under all rules.
More abstractly and in the case of an n-ary relation we are dealing with an operator ϕ :
PpD n q Ñ PpD n q with ϕpS i q S i 1 . Definition 2.10. An operator ϕ : PpD n q Ñ PpD n q is called monotone if S 1 S 2 implies ϕpS 1 q ϕpS 2 q. Definition 2.11. Let ϕ : PpD n q Ñ PpD n q be an operator. A set S PpD n q is called fixed point of ϕ if ϕpSq S. A fixed point S of ϕ is called least fixed point of ϕ if every fixed point S I of ϕ satisfies S S I .
We will see that every monotone operator has a unique least fixed point. The natural numbers can be defined as the least fixed point of the operator which adds 0 to a set and for every element m of the set adds m 1 to it and many data structures of relevance to computer science have similar inductive definitions.
The definitional principle that is behind the categoricity-theorem proved above then is that second-order logic is closed under least fixed points of monotone operators, i.e. if a monotone operator is second-order definable so is its least fixed points.
From this definition follows directly that if ϕ : PpD n q Ñ PpD n q has a least fixed point, then it is unique: for assume ϕ has two least fixed points S 1 and S 2 , then S 1 S 2 because S 1 is least fixed point and S 2 S 1 because S 2 is least fixed point and hence S 1 S 2 . Theorem 2.7. Every monotone operator ϕ : PpD n q Ñ PpD n q has a least fixed point. Proof 
for all k, l ¥ 0.
For proving the theorem we claim that
is the least fixed point. First R is a fixed point because
For showing that R is the least fixed point, assume that there is R I PpD n q with ϕpR I q R I . We have r R I , ϕprq ϕpR I q, . . ., i.e. ϕ i prq ϕ i pR I q for all i ¥ 0 by monotonicity of ϕ. Furthermore ϕ i pR I q R I for all i ¥ 0 because R I is a fixed point. Hence ϕ i prq R I for all i ¥ 0 and therefore R i¥0 ϕ i prq R I . For a monotone operator ϕ : PpD n q Ñ PpD n q we write lfppϕq for its least fixed point. Note furthermore that for monotone ϕ we have lfppϕq ϕpRqR R. The left-to-right direction follows from lfppϕq being contained in all R s.t. ϕpRq R. The right-to-left inclusion follows from lfppϕq being a fixed point and hence being in the intersection. The least fixed point of a monotone operator ϕ has hence the following equivalent representations: 4 . Let D Z and let ϕ be the operator which to a given S Z adds 0 and x 1 for all x S, i.e.
ϕpSq S t0u tx 1 | x Su. Then ϕ is monotone and the fixed points of ϕ are the sets of the form r¡k, Vr Z for k N and Z itself. The least fixed point is lfppϕq N.
The above observations are of a purely algebraic nature. The fact that a monotone operator has a unique least fixed point does not rely on logic. But we return to logic now by considering definitions of operators in second-order logic. Definition 2.12. Let pD, Iq be a structure and F be a formula whose free variables are X{n and y y 1 , . . . , y n . Then the expression λXλȳ.F is called definition of the operator ϕ : PpD n q Ñ PpD n q given by ϕpRq pI tX Þ Ñ Ruqpλȳ.F q. We also write IpλXλȳ.F q for this operator ϕ.
Example 2. 5 . The operator ϕ of Example 2.4 can be defined by λXλy. y X y 0 hz X y spzq.
The main theorem of this section is the following: Theorem 2.8. Let S pD, Iq be a structure and ϕ : PpD n q Ñ PpD n q be a monotone operator which is second-order definable, then lfppϕq is second-order definable.
Before we prove it we need two auxiliary observations on set-definitions. Nat dX p 0 X Ñ dx X spxq X Ñ y X q
From the proof-theoretic point of view the above definition provides the ability to prove a statement by induction in the following form:
We can continue to define other data types like trees, etc. in a similar fashion. For defining functions we now consider a mechanism that allows to introduce a new function symbol after having specified a functional relationship. As a reminder, the graph of a function f :
Our logical setting allows inductive definitions of sets and in order to mimic a recursive definition of a function one can proceed as follows:
Definition 2.13. Let T be a second-order theory 5 in some language L. If T 6 dx h!y F px, yq for a formula F whose free variables are amongx, y then we define a functional extension by adding a new function symbol f and defining T I as the deductive closure of T tdxdy pFpx, yq Ø f pxq yqu.
This provides a mechanism for defining new functions. One way of defining a new function is by recursion. For example, Q contains axioms that define addition in terms of the successor.
To mimic such a definition in our setting we proceed as follows 1. Give an inductive definition F px, yq of the graph of the function. 2 . Give an NK2-proof of dxh!y F px, yq.
Obtain a new function symbol f by taking the functional extension
An advantage of this procedure is the above definition of a functional extension is all we need beyond plain NK2.
Remark 2.1. An alternative to the above notion of functional extension would be to enrich our object-level language by a selection operator ι which is given a predicate as argument and will return an object satisfying this predicate (if there is any such object -if not, it may return anything). For example, the predecessor function p could be defined by p λx.ιpλy.y spxqq as the function which, given x as input will return a y for which the property y spxq holds (if there is any such y).
However, we refrain from using selection operators right now as they require a tighter integration with the lambda calculus.
Exercise 2. 6 . In this exercise we work in the language of rings L t0{0, 1{0, {2, ¡{1, ¤{2, ¡1 {1u and in the structure pR, Iq where I is the standard-interpretation of L with the convention that Ip0 ¡1 q Ip0q to ensure totality of the multiplicative inverse. Let ϕ : PpRq Ñ PpRq be the mapping which adds to a given S R the elements 0, 1, x y, x ¤ y, ¡x, x ¡1 for all x, y S.
1.
Show that ϕ is a monotone operator.
2. Find a formula F which defines ϕ.
What is the least fixed point of ϕ?
4. Find a formula G which defines the least fixed point of ϕ. A formula is said to be in negation-normal form (NNF) if it does not contain implication and negation appears only immediately above atoms. It is well known that every formula can be transformed into a logically equivalent NNF. 5 . Let F be a formula in NNF without second-order quantifiers s.t. λXλȳ.F defines an operator ϕ : PpD n q Ñ PpD n q and no occurrence of X in F appears below a negation. Show that ϕ is monotone. Hint: proceed by induction on F Exercise 2.8. We work in the language L t0{0, s{1u and the theory T , defined as deductive closure of the axioms dy Nat dx 0 $ spxq dxdy pspxq spyq Ñ x yq In this exercise we will do some programming based on this theory. The primitive recursive definition of addition of natural numbers is x 0 Ñ x, x spyq Ñ spx yq Our aim for this exercise is to obtain a new theory T I where the addition-function is available and then to prove properties of addition.
To that aim, first define the graph of the addition function:
Addpx, y, zq dX pdx I Xpx I , 0, x I q Ñ dx I y I z I pXpx I , y I , z I q Ñ Xpx I , spy I q, spz IÑ Xpx, y, zqq Give formal proofs of 1. dx Addpx, 0, xq and 2. dxdydz pAddpx, y, zq Ñ Addpx, spyq, spzqqq.
From now on we assume that also T 6 dxdyh!z Addpx, y, zq (but showing this is not part of this exercise). This allows to add a new binary function symbol , written in infix notation, to obtain the theory T I as deductive closure of T and tdxdydz pAddpx, y, zq Ø x y zqu.
Give formal proofs in T I of 3 . dx x 0 x and 4. dxdy x spyq spx yq.
Using this procedure we can extend our working theory by any function which has a primitive recursive definition. Beyond NK2 this procedure only uses the functional extension of a theory as described in the course notes. Once we have extended the theory by a newly defined function (such as ) we can prove properties of this function.
Give a formal proof in T I of
Hint: Establish the symmetric versions of properties 3. and 4. above first by induction:
dx 0 x x and dxdy spxq y spx yq. Then do an induction on either x 1 or x 2 .
Chapter 3
Higher-Order Logic
The Untyped Lambda Calculus
The untyped lambda calculus is an abstract notation for functions and is based on two fundamental operations on functions and terms. The first of them is application: F A denotes the application of the function F to the argument A. The second is abstraction: given a term A (usually -but not necessarily -containing x) we can form the function which maps a given x to A by writing λx.A.
For example, from the term x 3 1 we can build the function λx.x 3 1 which maps x to x 3 1.
Applying this function to 2 is written as the term pλx.x 3 1q2 which we will want to reduce to 2 3 1 by inserting the argument 2 for the parameter x of the function.
Let us now make these ideas precise: For example λxy.yx and λxy I .y I x are α-equivalent. We will identify terms which are α-equivalent and allow renaming of bound variables at any time. During β-reduction this may indeed sometimes become necessary as the following β-reduction sequence shows pλx.xxqpλyz.yzq Ñ β pλyz.yzqpλyz.yzq Ñ β λz.pλyz.yzqz α λz.pλyz I .yz I qz Ñ β λzz I .zz I
The following theorem shows that the lambda calculus is confluent, this is also sometimes called the Church-Rosser property. There are terms whose reduction does not terminate: pλx.xxqpλx.xxq Ñ β pλx.xxqpλx.xxq Ñ β ¤ ¤ ¤ A way to avoid this is to forbid self-application as in the term xx by introducing types, we will see how to do this soon.
The lambda calculus is a very strong formalism. It allows to represent all computable functions. To show this we need a representation of natural numbers in the lambda calculus, a good way to do this are Church numerals. Define the n-fold application of a term F to a term M , written
Proof. Without proof (see a course on the lambda calculus). Hint: it may be helpful to split this reduction using several auxiliary calculations. 4 . Show that A s ms n Ñ β m n for all m, n N.
Simple Type Theory
The lambda calculus allows to apply terms to themselves, like in the case xx. In some situations this is natural: for example a C-compiler which is written in C can take its own code as input.
In other situations it is not, for example the expression cospcosq (intended to denote application of the cosine function to itself) does not make sense, but cospπq does. The reason for this is that π R and cos : R Ñ R, more verbosely: cos is a function taking a real number as argument so cospπq is well-typed but cospcosq is not because cos is not a real number. This observation builds the basis for the simply typed lambda calculus. Types -as implications -associate to the right, so τ Ñ σ Ñ ρ abbreviates τ Ñ pσ Ñ ρq. Example 3.3. We can introduce "set" as abbreviation of ι Ñ o. An operator such as those considered in the previous section is a function that maps sets to sets and hence of type set Ñ set, i.e. pι Ñ oq Ñ pι Ñ oq.
Variables will directly be annotated with a type using the notation x τ for x V and τ T.
Consequently two variables of different type are always considered different and two variables of the same type are the same iff they have the same underlying untyped variable. An expression of the form M : τ is called type judgment and is read as "M is of type τ ".
Definition 3.5. The logical constants are:
Definition 3. 6 . A simply typed language L is a set of typed constants (different from the logical constants).
Example 3. 4 . In our type-theoretic setting, the language of arithmetic is L t0 : ι, s : :
This type derivation shows that d ι λx ι . pPx ι qQpfx ι q is a formula. In the standard notation of first-order logic this is written as: dx pPpxq Ñ Qpf pxqqq.
The extension of the semantics from first-to second-order logic was rather straightforward in that we have taken set quantifiers to quantify over sets of the domain and function quantifiers to quantify over functions. The extension to higher-order logic is as straightforward: having quantification over any simple type we interpret a quantifier of type τ by an object of type τ . For example a quantifier of type ι Ñ o will just be the set quantifier dX familiar from second-order logic. A quantifier of type pι Ñ oq Ñ o quantifies over all sets of sets, etc. 
Also the semantics of these defined logical constants has the expected behavior. Let S pD, Iq be a structure and observe that Ipuq false and Ip2q is negation: To ease notation we will often omit type information on bound variables, so that e.g. λy ιÑι x ι .y ιÑι x ι is more briefly written as λy ιÑι x ι .yx. Exercise 3.2. We have defined u and 2 as simply typed expressions. Analogously to these, define binary disjunction , binary conjunction , logical equivalence Ø and the existential quantifier h τ as simply typed expression. Give type derivations and show that the semantics has the expected behavior. This theorem states that all β-reduction sequences of a simply typed lambda term are finite. There are reduction systems that only possess the weaker property that there is a finite reduction sequence. This latter property is called weak normalization.
Proofs
This theorem also shows that, in particular, the non-terminating lambda term pλx.xxqpλx.xxq is not typable. Indeed, in a certain sense, the very point of types is that they guarantee termination. By strong normalization and confluence every term has exactly one beta-normal form. Hence inter-reducibility by beta-reduction and alpha-renaming is a decidable equivalence relation and will be denoted by αβ .
We are now in a position to define a proof system NKω for simple type theory: there are no axioms, only assumptions. are derivable in NKω.
Exercise 3. 4 . Define set-complementation comp as a simply typed expression. Give a type derivation and show that the semantics has the expected behavior. Equality reasoning in NKω is done using Leibniz equality for individuals by defining:
This definition is extended to all simple types by defining:
Define a simply typed formula F that states: "for any set of individuals X: the complement of the complement of X is X". Give a type derivation for F . Prove F in NKω. You may assume at your disposal the usual inference rules for , , Ø, 2, h τ in NKω (see Exercise 3.3).
Subsystems
We can now recover first-and second-order logic within simple type theory. A language in both first-and second-order logic consisted of constant symbols, function symbols and predicate symbols. Constant and function symbols have types from
while predicate symbols have types from
Definition 3.11. Let A be a simply typed formula s.t. every non-logical symbol occurring in A is of a type in T F or in T P . Then A is said to be a formula of second-order logic. Furthermore, if all d τ in A satisfy τ ι then A is said to be a formula of first-order logic.
From a purely formal point of view, simple type theory is one formal system, first-order logic another and second-order logic yet another. The above definition could be made more precise by first defining additional connectives like , , h τ in simple type theory, then defining (the straightforward) translations from first-and second-order logic to simple type theory and finally showing that these translations preserve truth (and hence validity). For time constraints we refrain from carrying out this in detail here, partially this will be done in the exercises. In the end the moral is that first-and second-order logic can be considered subsystems of simple type theory and in particular: whenever something is first-or second-order definable it is also definable in simple type theory. This leads to the following results:
Theorem 3. 4 . The compactness theorem fails in simple type theory.
Proof. Let L i be the first-order formula that defines the structures of size at least i and remember that finiteness can be defined by a second-order formula Fin. Let Γ tFinu tL i | i ¥ 1u and observe that every finite Γ 0 Γ is satisfiable but Γ is not. Proof. Note that there is a program P which when given a higher-order formula determines whether it is a second-order formula or not (by checking the types of all quantifiers).
Suppose that the valid formulas of higher-order logic are recursively enumerable by some program Q, then the valid formulas of second-order logic are recursively enumerable as well (by using both P and Q). Contradiction.
Henkin-Completeness
So, as in second-order logic, the completeness theorem does not hold in simple type theory. Nevertheless, there is a natural proof formalism -NKω -and the question of finding a semantic characterization of the formulas provable in NKω is natural as well. In this section we will sketch such a characterization.
The starting point are NKω-proofs and the observation that one can make explicit (in the form of first-order axioms) the properties of types that are used in such proofs. Formally, this will mean recovering simple type theory as a first-order theory, i.e. as a formal system obtained from pure first-order logic by adding these axioms.
To that aim we will define a translation from simply typed formulas to formulas in this firstorder theory. The basic idea is to add, for each type τ T a unary predicate symbol T τ intended to denote "is of type τ ". This will allow to express quantification over higher-types as bounded first-order quantification by translating dx τ A to dx pT τ pxq Ñ Aq.
In order to carry out this translation we first introduce a version of simple type theory that is based on relations only.
Definition 3.12. Relational type theory is defined as follows. A simply typed language L is called relational if all its elements have types in T F T R .
The relational formulas are defined as follows:
1. The terms of type ι are defined as in first-order logic.
2. The terms of a relational type σ $ ι are the variables of type σ.
Without Proof.
The above result characterizes provability in NKω by provability in the first-order theory TT. In first-order logic however we do have a completeness theorem which, when applied to the above lemma, has the following immediate corollary: TT 6 A s iff S @ A s for all S with S @ TT.
This shows that there is a class of structures w.r.t. which NKω is complete, namely the structures S satisfying TT. Such a structure interprets the translation A s of a simply typed formula A. In the rest of this section we will primarily concern ourselves with how to transfer back the satisfaction of TT to the level of semantics. This will give rise to the notion of Henkin-structure and lead to the characterization of the formulas provable in NKω as those which are true in all Henkin-structures.
The above Lemma 3.1 is an important result for the following reason: the completeness theorem is a strong connection between the syntactic side of proofs and the semantic side of structures.
We have seen that the completeness theorem does not survive the transition from first-to second-and higher-order logic -and this despite the fact that this transition is quite natural on both, the syntactic and the semantic side. The above Lemma 3.1 helps to explain why this connection breaks down: the generalization of proofs from first-to higher-order logic is, in fact, quite weak: provability in NKω can be characterized by provability in a first-order theory. This is in stark contrast to the semantic side where the interpretation of set-quantifiers as ranging over all subsets gives definitional power that does not exist in first-order logic as we had the chance to witness at several occasions in this course.
The central difference between interpreting A and A s is that in the standard semantics of simply typed L-formulas, the interpretation of a type τ is fixed to be D τ . In contrast to that, when interpreting a A in a structure S, the interpretation of the predicate T τ is part of the structure S.
This observation forms the starting point of the Henkin semantics of simple type theory. Instead of fixing the interpretation of a type τ to be D τ we will make the interpretation of τ part of the structure.
Definition 3.16. Let L be a simply typed language. A Henkin-L-prestructure is a pair H pD, Iq s.t.
• Ipoq ttrue, falseu and Ipιq D.
• Ipτ q D τ for every τ T.
• Ipcq Ipτ q for every c : τ L. As always, when L is irrelevant or clear from the context, we simply speak about a Henkinprestructure.
Type Theory at Work
Higher-order logic as we have seen it in the last few sections builds a popular logical basis for many proof assistants because of its flexibility and powerful type checking mechanisms. These proof assistants are interactive theorem proving environments that assist a user in fully formalizing a proof. Many of these systems are quite flexible with applications ranging from software verification to formalization of large mathematical proofs.
Among the most fully developed proof assistants are the systems Exercise 3. 5 . Use Isabelle/HOL to define the inductive datatype of trees (of some type 'a) as we did for lists above. Define a function numleaves which computes the number of leaves of a given tree. Define a function insert which takes two trees T and S and replaces every leaf of T by the tree S. Prove that numleaves (insert T S) = (numleaves T) * (numleaves S).
